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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The passage of Measures 5 and 50 drastically changed the way property taxes were assessed in 
Oregon. The measures were intended to limit the ability of government to raise property taxes, 
while achieving other goals such as equalizing school funding across the state. The property tax 
system that resulted is complex and has introduced inequities into the system based on 
differing rates of changes between assessed value (AV) and real market value (RMV).     
The League of Oregon Cities (LOC) asked the Northwest Economic Research Center (NERC) to 
investigate the effect of the tax structure on residential sale prices as part of ongoing efforts to 
understand the impacts of Oregon’s property tax system on local governments. Specifically, we 
wanted to investigate the magnitude of property tax capitalization - if two houses are similar in 
all ways except for their property tax payments, do their sale prices differ as a result? 
We found that differences in property tax payments are having a significant effect on sale price.  
Assuming a discount rate of 3% and perpetual lifespan of properties, we expect a property that 
would last into perpetuity to show capitalization of $33.33 for every dollar decrease in property 
taxes. To illustrate capitalization of property tax differences in property value, we use the average 
house sold in our sample as an example. The average house is approximately 1,600 square-feet, 
sold for $313,995 and has an AV/RMV ratio of 65.27% and an effective tax rate of 1.37% (based 
on RMV). Depending on the estimation specification, we find that the capitalization of property 
taxes into property value in the Portland area ranges from 15% to 92%.  This is illustrated in Figure 
1 for a range of AV/RMV ratios above and below the average. 
   
Figure 1: Summary of Effects 
Average Portland House 
Sale Price = $ 313,995 | 1,600 Sqft  
Tax Rate (on AV) = 2.1% | RMV = $291,490 
AV/RMV Ratio = 65% | Effective Tax Rate (on RMV) = 1.37% 
 
AV/RMV Ratio 
45% 55% 65% 70% 75% 
Assessed Tax $2,755 $3,366 $3,979 $4,284 $4,591 
Actual Tax $2,755 $3,366 $3,979 $4,284 $4,372 
Sale Price 
$320,203 - 
$344,829 
$317,099 - 
$329,412 
$313,995 
$312,443 - 
$306,287 
$310,891 - 
$298,578 
Sale Price Change 
(Lower Bound) 
$6,208 $3,104  -$1,552 -$3,104 
Sale Price Change  
(Upper Bound) 
$30,834 $15,417  -$7,709 -$15,417 
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In order to quantify this effect, we used regression analysis to isolate the influence of property 
taxes while controlling for other relevant determinants of sale price. Certified tax rolls from 
Multnomah County were combined with sales data to create a database with residential 
characteristics for Portland tax lots. We considered only single-family homes (and condominiums 
occupied by single families) that were sold between 2010-2013, and dropped from the dataset 
sales that were classified as “distressed” or not as “arm’s length.”  Neighborhood characteristics 
and school quality are also important determinants of residential value. We geocoded our 
addresses and joined them with geographical characteristics like crime rate, school quality, and 
distance to downtown. 
Using a variety of regression specifications, we estimated the effect of property tax on sale price. 
To measure the effect of property tax on sale price we used three variables: AV/RMV ratio, 
compression ratio, and effective tax rate. Due to estimation issues, we did not arrive at one 
definitive coefficient estimating property tax capitalization. We are confident that property tax 
policy is having an effect on sale price, but must report a range of possible values. 
The inequities in the property tax system are largely driven by changes in RMV. Although this 
effect is not uniform because of differing tax rates, houses that have experienced large growth 
in value since the inception of the current system tend to be paying less as a percentage of their 
homes’ value in taxes, which is increasing sale price. From a policy perspective, the distribution 
of this effect is arbitrary and may be disproportionately benefitting property owners who can 
afford to buy in areas with faster increases in property values. This report focuses on Portland, 
but this same dynamic is likely at play in the rest of the state.  We would expect to see this effect 
in other Oregon cities in which there are large disparities in the increase in home values since the 
inception of Measures 5 and 50 by neighborhood or area.  The property tax system creates a 
hidden subsidy for these property owners.  Some of the burden of funding government and 
school services is transferred away from these properties.  This results in revenue shortfalls, or 
creates the need for property owners in areas with a smaller increase in RMV to fill the gap. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Northwest Economic Research Center (NERC) has been charged with examining how differences 
in property taxes due to Measure 5 and 50 have impacted the real estate market in Oregon. In 
particular, we will examine whether housing prices have been impacted by differences in 
assessed values and property taxes imposed by these two measures. We begin our study with an 
overview of Oregon’s property tax system. The following sections describe relevant literature 
that guides our research direction, data sources, methodology, estimation results and discussion 
of further research.  
 
Oregon’s Property Tax System Since 1990 – Measure 5 and 50 
In the 1990s, Oregonians passed Measures 5 and 50, setting off a series of major changes. The 
intent was to limit and establish predictability of property taxes. While these intentions have 
been mostly realized, there have been additional outcomes which have wreaked havoc on local 
government revenue streams and potentially affected purchasing decisions of Oregon 
homebuyers, the subject of this report. 
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History of Oregon’s Property Tax Legislation 
Property owners, especially homeowners, became increasingly concerned by growing tax rates 
in the 1980s. This was mostly driven by two factors: property values were stagnant and local 
governments continued to expand the tax base at the maximum allowed six percent per year. 
Voters responded to their concerns by passing Measure 5 in 1990 (City Club of Portland, 2013). 
This was the first in the series of pivotal acts passed by voters in the 1990s. Measure 5 placed 
limits on property tax collected per $1,000 of real market value (RMV). The measure set a $5 per 
$1,000 limit on property taxes going to fund schools - to be phased in between the 1991-92 and 
1995-96 biennia - and a limit of $10 per $1,000 of RMV for all other government services. In many 
areas taxes exceed these limits. In each case where the limit is exceeded, taxes are reduced down 
to the limit. This process, called compression, lowers property tax bills for many residents, but 
also results in millions of dollars of decreased revenues for many local governments (cities, 
counties and special districts) and schools. 
 
Unfortunately, for those voters expecting Measure 5 to reduce their property tax bill, the 1990s 
were characterized by a surge in property values. Because the Measure 5 property tax caps are 
linked to RMV, some tax bills grew in spite of the imposed limits. This gave voters the impression 
that their vote to limit property taxes had done little to nothing (Linhares & Provost 2011).  
 
Seven years after Oregon voters showed their support for Measure 5 they approved Measure 50, 
an even more aggressive attempt to limit property taxes. Where Measure 5 imposed limits in the 
form of rates, Measure 50 went further; it changed the concepts of both tax rates and assessed 
taxable values (Oregon Department of Revenue, 2009).  Essentially, local district tax rates were 
reduced and made permanent. This action officially moved Oregon’s system from a levy to a rate 
based system. In addition, the measure de-coupled real market values from taxable, or assessed 
values.  The measure pegged the new assessed value at 90% of a property’s 1995-96 value and 
restricted annual growth in assessed value to three percent. Furthermore, this new law stipulated 
that assessed value could not exceed real market value.   
 
In Portland, property values in 1995-96 varied significantly across the city. These variations were 
essentially locked into the system in perpetuity by Measure 50. As home values have grown or 
decreased at different rates since the mid-90s, it is now possible for property owners with similar 
and even proximate properties to pay drastically different taxes. Although the objectives of 
stabilizing property taxes have been achieved, the structure of Oregon’s property   
tax laws may have produced unintentional costs and inequalities.
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Effects of Measure 5 and Measure 50 
The two measures created two separate limits that 
come into play depending on the AV and RMV of a 
property.   
 
 Measure 50 Limit: AV * Tax Rates = Tax Extended 
 Measure 5 Limit: RMV * Maximum Category Rate 
($5 schools/ $10 general gov’t) = Maximum 
Allowable Tax 
 
If the tax extended is greater than the maximum 
allowable tax, compression occurs, reducing the 
amount of tax each jurisdiction can collect. 
 
According to Linhares & Provost (2011), the Oregon 
property tax system is functioning in line with what 
voters approved more than two decades ago. They 
explain that the bulk of responsibility to fund public 
education has been shifted to the state and property 
tax bills have been made more predictable; however, 
these outcomes are tilted in favor of the property 
owner. When other key stakeholders are considered 
the viability of the system as it exists may be 
questioned.  
 
These other stakeholders -- citizens in general, the 
local governments, and the state government -- have 
each felt the pinch of restricted revenue streams and 
the subsequent struggle of state and local government 
to provide adequate services. In a recent report, the City Club of Portland identified several issues 
with the Oregon system as it is currently functioning:  
 
 The system contains and is exacerbating inequities 
 It appears to be undermining local control  
 It is failing to maintain voter approved service levels  
 The system is “wretchedly” complex, effectively undermining constituent confidence in its 
functionality (City Club of Portland 2013).  
Calculating Property Taxes 
 
Calculating the actual tax due for a 
household can be complicated due to the 
multiple rates and valuation methods.  The 
calculation begins with the comparison of 
two values, based on a property’s AV and 
RMV.  Based on its location in various taxing 
districts, each property will have a number 
of government tax rates and a number of 
education tax rates.  The sum of these rates 
is then multiplied by the AV to calculate the 
base tax.  If the calculated base tax exceeds 
the Measure 5 cap [1.5% of current RMV 
(1% for general government and 0.5% for 
educational taxes)], any temporary voter-
approved property tax measure for specific 
services (such as increased funding for 
public safety, libraries or schools) is 
reduced first, all the way to $0 if necessary. 
If the taxes still exceed Measure 5 caps, 
each permanent tax rate component within 
the base tax is then compressed 
proportionally such that the base tax will 
equal the Measure 5 cap.   
 
In order to calculate final taxes, the bonded 
general government and bonded education 
rates, which fund capital construction 
projects, such as new buildings or 
equipment, are multiplied by the AV and 
added to the base tax.  These bonded rates 
are not subject to the property tax caps.   
 
7 
 
OREGON PROPERTY TAX CAPITALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM PORTLAND 
 
   
      
  
  
Oregon’s Electric Vehicle Industry   
Northwest Economic Research Center 
 
In addition, it appears the system may be inconsistent with market movements. Property tax 
imposed in Oregon as a whole has been growing at a decreasing rate since 2010, while inflation 
has been growing at a consistently higher rate. This relationship can be observed in Multnomah 
County where total property tax imposed grew by a little less than 1.4 percent between 2011 and 
2012 while inflation grew by 2.3 percent (Oregon Department of Revenue 2013). 
 
Among the above mentioned issues, perhaps one of the most prominent is that the 
Oregon system has effectively disconnected the amount paid in property taxes from the 
value of the property. This is made apparent by horizontal inequity, the case in which 
property owners with similarly valued properties and levels of service pay dramatically 
different property tax rates. 
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II. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
 
Over the years there has been substantial attention given to the economic effects of the property 
tax, and  up until the late 1960s it was generally considered to be much like any other tax - i.e., it 
created deadweight loss, leaving some capital un-invested and some property unproduced 
(Hamilton 1976). But Hamilton points out that this assumption was challenged by Mieszkowski 
in 1969.1 Mieszkowski (1969) suggested that the variation in property tax rates between localities 
would be capitalized into the value of the property, whether it is land, buildings, etc. This concept 
of capitalization is the underlying interest in this analysis.  
                                                          
1 Note that Mieszkowski (1969) did not challenge Hamilton (1976) but rather Hamilton cited Mieszkowski’s work. 
The publishing dates may create confusion but they do not contradict each other.  
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Full Capitalization and the Implications 
Expanding on the work of Mieszkowski, Hamilton (1976) concluded that perfect capitalization 
may result in horizontal equity – i.e., property owners that are in similar economic situations pay 
the same tax. Hamilton bases his findings in a theoretical model that assumes a proportional 
property tax in every community as well as an equal distribution of public services. It is important 
to note that his model is highly stylized. For instance, it only considers residential property and it 
assumes that there are only two classes of property – high income and low income. Furthermore, 
it holds that there are communities which are only composed of one or the other of these 
property types. 
 
The Incidence of the Property Tax 
While much attention – e.g., Mieszkowski and Hamilton – has been given to the economic effects 
of the property tax, the incidence is still a contested point among researchers. Zodrow (2007) 
presents an overview and analysis of the research to date. He compares and contrasts the three 
principle views of property tax incidence: the Traditional, Benefit, and Capital Tax views. The 
author suggests that the capital tax view is grounded in the traditional view and incorporates 
elements of the benefit view; namely, that local residents will shoulder the full burden of any 
increase in property tax. This being said, there are distinct differences between the two views. 
The capital tax view holds that a property tax distorts the distribution of capital (e.g., land, 
buildings, etc.) within a local region, whereas the benefit view holds that a property tax has no 
effect on the distribution of resources.   
 
Examples of Capitalization from Other Locales 
The theoretical discussions of capitalization and incidence of the property tax are useful, but 
empirical proof is necessary. Two studies looking at the effects of property tax legislation in 
California and Massachusetts helped provide this empirical proof. The passage of California’s 
Proposition 13 in 1978 and Massachusetts’s Proposition 212 in 1980 both placed significant 
limitations on the amount of property tax levied. These major shifts in tax policy inspired many 
research inquiries, looking at topics ranging from the political economy that led to the passage 
of the propositions to the distributional effects; but there was also the question of whether the 
tax reductions were capitalized into the value of the property.  
 
In 1982 Kenneth Rosen analyzed home value and property tax rate data across 64 jurisdictions in 
the San Francisco Bay area. He looked at data pre- and post- Proposition 13 and found compelling 
evidence that the reduced property taxes were in fact capitalized into the property values. Using 
regression techniques, Rosen found that a one dollar decrease in property tax in California led to 
a seven dollar increase in property value (Rosen 1982). However, there may be longer term 
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effects associated with decreased levels of public services associated with lower property tax 
revenues. 
 
Similarly Bradbury, Mayer, and Case analyze the effects of property tax limitations resulting from 
Massachusetts’ Proposition 212 (2001). Their analysis sought to identify whether towns that 
were more restricted in their ability to generate revenue tended to spend less on local services, 
effectively reducing the town’s attractiveness to potential home buyers. They found that school 
spending was affected the most and their analysis revealed that cities with “good schools” - as 
measured by 1990 test scores - saw significantly greater rates of appreciation in home values.  
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III. METHODOLOGY & DATA  
Before performing the regression analysis detailed in the next section, we needed to combine 
data from a variety of sources to allow us to isolate the effect of tax policy from the other 
determinants of house sale price.   
 
Housing prices are determined by a combination of factors such as property characteristics (e.g., 
interior square-footage, lot size, number of rooms, age, quality, etc.), neighborhood and location 
characteristics (e.g., distance to central business district, access to transportation, access to 
shops, etc.), and public service characteristics (e.g., public school districts, safety, etc.). After 
controlling for differences in these factors, housing prices can additionally vary due to differences 
in property tax levels (and effective tax rates) resulting from Measure 5 and Measure 50. The 
reduced-form equation for our housing price regression models can be expressed as follows: 
 
where Pi is the property sale price, Hi is a vector of property characteristics, Si is a vector of public 
school characteristics and Ni is a vector of neighborhood characteristics that includes public 
services and amenities. The estimated β coefficients will represent the marginal value of these 
characteristics to a homebuyer, and ε represents the remaining residuals. 
 
The combination of time-variant and -invariant variables led us to use a mixed-effects OLS 
regression specification. The mixed-effect functional form isolates the effect of each individual 
variable on home sale prices. A properly specified function should include all major determinants 
of property sale prices, allowing for an unbiased estimation of the effect of program participation. 
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Whether housing prices have increased as a result of lower assessed values dictated by the 
combination of Measure 5 and 50 can be answered by examining the degree of capitalization of 
property tax differences into property values. In the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 
Ross and Yinger (1999) specify the capitalization of property tax differences into property values 
as follows: 
 
where ΔV represents the change in property value, ΔT represents the difference in property tax 
paid, r represents the discount rate and α represents the degree of capitalization. The equation 
can be altered to represent capitalization with a limited lifespan of n years as follows:  
 
Assuming known discount rates and known lifespan of properties, the estimated coefficients on 
property tax measures in the regression analysis will provide the basis to calculate the degree of 
capitalization for properties in the Portland area. 
Specification refers to the functional form of the estimation equation, and includes the choice of 
variables. Sensitivity analysis involves making small changes to the regression specification. The 
way in which estimates react to small changes gives the researcher clues about the validity of the 
model, and can also draw attention to issues that still need to be resolved. If the estimated effect 
of the variable in question changes drastically due to changes in other variables, or by changing 
the functional form, then the estimates are not trustworthy. We utilized sensitivity analysis to 
validate our regression results as well as the capitalization measures.   
  
Data 
In order to construct the dataset for our estimations, we began with the last four years of certified 
tax rolls from Multnomah County (including the most recent, 2013-2014).  This dataset covers 
every tax lot in Multnomah County.  From this dataset, we had the location of the house and 
information about the house itself, like square footage, number of bedrooms, etc.  Each record 
also included the current RMV, AV, and tax code for each property (more on these measures 
later).   
 
The study only considers single family, residential units so commercial properties, multi-family 
housing, and other properties that did not fit our definition were dropped.  The tax lots we 
considered were made up almost exclusively of single-family houses and single-family 
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condominiums2.  Because we are measuring the effect of tax policy on sale price, we needed to 
further reduce the records to only include houses that had been sold during the period for which 
we had certified tax information.  To do this, we combined a separate dataset of Multnomah 
County home sales dating back to 2000.  This allowed us to identify which houses had been sold 
during our study period, and when they were sold.  It also allowed us to track the type of sale.  
During our study period, there were an unusually large number of foreclosures, short sales, and 
other types of distressed transactions.  We eliminated these types of distressed sales, as well as 
sales that were not conducted at “arm’s length” (transfer between family members, for 
example).   
 
The dataset included RMV and AV for each property, which we used to calculate the actual tax 
paid in each year.  Multnomah County publishes the tax limited and bonded tax rates for each 
taxing district in the county.  These taxing districts overlap, meaning that houses relatively close 
to each other could be subject to different rates.  Using the tax code for each property from the 
certified tax rolls, we matched education and government rates (both limited and bond), and 
used these rates to calculate the actual tax paid.  The sidebar on page 6 explains this process.  In 
addition, we calculated the compression ratio and the effective tax rate on RMV as alternative 
measures of property tax levels. The compression ratio is calculated as calculated taxes 
(excluding bond rates) divided by the Measure 5 cap of 1.5% of RMV times 100, representing the 
percentage of the total calculated taxes that is actually paid by the household. Effective tax rate 
is the actual tax paid divided by RMV, representing the effective tax rate as a percentage of the 
real market value.  
 
A goal of this study was to move beyond existing measures of tax policy on property value and 
incorporate controls related to other determinants of value.  To do this, we geocoded all of our 
property addresses, and assigned a neighborhood to each property.  Then, we used a dataset 
showing incidence of crime in Portland to calculate a crime rate for each neighborhood (number 
of crime per 1000 residents) in 2012.  The distance from each neighborhood centroid to 
downtown was used to measure distance to the central business district.  Walk Score® produces 
measures of the walkability, bikeability, and quality of public transit in each neighborhood.  We 
found collinearity between these neighborhood amenities measures, which indicated that 
neighborhoods that tended to have good walkability also tended to be highly bikeable and have 
better access to public transportation. Therefore, the specifications shown in this report utilize 
only the Walk Score® as a measure of neighborhood accessibility. 
 
                                                          
2 Single family condominiums refer to multi-family properties that have been converted to condominiums, where 
ownership of each unit is separate. Apartment buildings (and other types of multi-family units) that are owned by 
commercial entities are not considered in this study. 
14 
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In the literature covering the determinants of sale price, school quality is frequently found to be 
significant.  To incorporate this variable, we used the geocoded addresses and joined each to an 
elementary school catchment area.  Most of the properties were assigned a Portland Public 
Schools elementary school, but the properties in East Portland were assigned to the appropriate 
school in the Reynolds, David Douglas, Parkrose, or Centennial School Districts.  The state 
publishes reading and math scores for each school which represented the percentage of students 
that met or exceeded state standards; these were used as our measure of school quality.     
 
The following figures illustrate differences in sale property characteristics by neighborhood.  As 
we explain in later sections, property characteristics and neighborhood amenities tend to cluster 
geographically; properties tend to be grouped by size, age, and sale price.  This means that we 
can experience confounding effects when using all potential variables. Table I below summarizes 
population, population growth, mean sale price, mean age of house sold and mean size of house 
sold as a supplement to the graphical presentations. 
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Table I – Summary statistics by neighborhood 
Neighborhood 
Pop. 
(2010) 
Pop. Growth 
(2000-2010) 
Mean Sale 
Price 
(2010-2013) 
Mean Age 
of House 
Sold 
Mean Size of 
House Sold 
(sqft) 
Alameda 5,214 3.51% $        533,807 85 2,259 
Arbor Lodge 6,153 1.45% $        270,907 77 1,488 
Ardenwald-Johnson 
Creek 
4,748 -0.17% $        259,681 56 1,590 
Argay 6,006 3.23% $        237,117 45 2,052 
Arlington Heights 718 3.46% $        643,570 53 2,670 
Arnold Creek 3,125 6.66% $        438,278 25 2,609 
Ashcreek 5,719 2.84% $        312,730 37 1,901 
Beaumont-Wilshire 5,346 0.26% $        434,227 76 1,861 
Boise 3,311 6.16% $        284,818 90 1,451 
Brentwood-Darlington 12,994 13.18% $        165,021 52 1,206 
Bridgeton 725 107.14% $        302,500 9 2,262 
Bridlemile 5,481 -3.03% $        449,122 44 2,388 
Brooklyn 3,485 -1.61% $        291,639 92 1,454 
Buckman 8,472 6.93% $        338,442 95 1,621 
Cathedral Park 3,349 10.42% $        218,419 62 1,329 
Centennial 23,662 11.05% $        150,013 46 1,371 
Collins View 3,036 32.52% $        383,946 43 2,059 
Concordia 9,550 -0.15% $        307,094 70 1,600 
Creston-Kenilworth 8,227 -0.09% $        255,051 80 1,387 
Crestwood 1,047 -3.06% $        264,987 36 1,580 
Cully 13,209 2.93% $        213,492 59 1,364 
Downtown 12,801 28.65% $        340,320 27 1,088 
East Columbia 1,748 17.32% $        222,312 35 1,744 
Eastmoreland 5,007 0.58% $        539,654 73 2,402 
Eliot 3,611 7.50% $        303,384 75 1,601 
Far Southwest 1,320 -16.72% $        371,729 30 2,420 
Forest Park 4,129 20.34% $        603,580 25 3,575 
Foster-Powell 7,335 -0.45% $        198,250 76 1,270 
Glenfair 3,417 32.70% $        171,050 40 1,649 
Goose Hollow 6,507 16.30% $        328,172 36 1,254 
Grant Park 3,937 4.46% $        535,028 88 2,142 
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Table I (continued) – Summary statistics by neighborhood 
Neighborhood 
Pop. 
(2010) 
Pop. Growth 
(2000-2010) 
Mean Sale 
Price 
(2010-2013) 
Mean Age 
of House 
Sold 
Mean Size of 
House Sold 
(sqft) 
Hayden Island 2,270 6.57% $        228,186 31 1,320 
Hayhurst 5,382 1.22% $        331,231 49 1,965 
Hazelwood 23,462 17.19% $        174,097 49 1,491 
Healy Heights 187 -4.10% $        738,790 52 3,288 
Hillsdale 7,540 8.08% $        381,083 52 2,082 
Hillside 2,200 12.42% $        698,291 54 2,665 
Hollywood 1,578 13.61% $        321,472 67 1,493 
Homestead 2,009 23.86% $        506,349 21 1,697 
Hosford-Abernethy 7,336 4.70% $        402,064 87 1,757 
Humboldt 5,110 0.97% $        329,253 83 1,675 
Irvington 8,501 0.18% $        567,069 86 2,406 
Kenton 7,272 4.87% $        219,769 64 1,268 
Kerns 5,340 4.81% $        315,136 81 1,334 
King 6,149 3.55% $        292,420 85 1,473 
Laurelhurst 4,633 1.85% $        501,440 86 2,237 
Lents 20,465 9.96% $        146,701 56 1,245 
Linnton 941 -9.87% $        247,653 44 1,685 
Lloyd District 1,142 88.76% $        140,426 55 712 
Madison South 7,130 2.02% $        197,551 57 1,517 
Maplewood 2,557 -1.58% $        317,075 48 1,808 
Markham 2,248 -3.19% $        298,320 40 1,955 
Marshall Park 1,248 8.62% $        377,155 43 2,177 
Mill Park 8,650 24.80% $        162,209 48 1,435 
Montavilla 16,287 0.32% $        204,552 68 1,272 
Mt. Scott-Arleta 7,397 1.79% $        199,696 71 1,241 
Mt. Tabor 10,162 1.80% $        379,296 71 1,865 
Multnomah 7,409 11.18% $        292,228 46 1,577 
North Tabor 5,163 15.43% $        303,543 75 1,557 
Northwest District 13,399 6.38% $        400,436 64 1,427 
Northwest Heights 4,806 112.84% $        575,362 11 3,268 
Old Town-Chinatown 3,922 33.81% $        178,526 22 830 
Overlook 6,093 0.00% $        307,734 75 1,518 
Parkrose 6,363 5.52% $        171,497 62 1,338 
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Table I (continued) – Summary statistics by neighborhood 
Neighborhood 
Pop. 
(2010) 
Pop. Growth 
(2000-2010) 
Mean Sale Price 
(2010-2013) 
Mean Age 
of House 
Sold 
Mean Size of 
House Sold 
(sqft) 
Parkrose Heights 6,119 0.43% $        173,722 54 1,379 
Pearl 5,997 438.81% $        457,106 29 1,178 
Piedmont 7,025 9.30% $        255,658 74 1,502 
Pleasant Valley 12,743 57.65% $        269,567 18 2,307 
Portsmouth 9,789 17.88% $        203,935 53 1,334 
Powellhurst-Gilbert 30,639 34.23% $        153,409 41 1,336 
Reed 4,399 10.72% $        326,943 55 1,878 
Richmond 11,607 3.22% $        345,295 85 1,527 
Rose City Park 8,982 1.55% $        365,452 85 1,757 
Roseway 6,323 -1.57% $        259,867 75 1,403 
Russell 3,175 0.13% $        193,146 53 1,580 
Sabin 4,149 0.68% $        375,919 86 1,596 
Sellwood-Moreland 11,621 8.85% $        341,821 75 1,493 
South Burlingame 1,747 12.35% $        337,607 54 1,935 
South Portland 6,631 36.30% $        350,769 31 1,468 
South Tabor 5,995 -2.22% $        257,436 65 1,414 
Southwest Hills 8,389 1.10% $        732,081 62 2,844 
St. Johns 12,207 7.59% $        180,850 57 1,216 
Sullivan's Gulch 3,139 3.15% $        264,786 61 1,212 
Sumner 2,137 1.81% $        154,040 68 1,159 
Sunderland 718 22.74% $        251,000 58 2,117 
Sunnyside 7,354 2.78% $        321,114 48 1,384 
Sylvan-Highlands 1,317 9.02% $        478,022 37 2,367 
University Park 6,035 14.95% $        274,993 68 1,613 
Vernon 2,585 -11.59% $        310,432 83 1,599 
West Portland Park 3,921 3.87% $        265,386 34 1,781 
Wilkes 8,775 13.33% $        199,944 31 1,633 
Woodland Park 176 -41.72% $        158,446 67 1,316 
Woodlawn 4,933 0.90% $        247,135 72 1,404 
Woodstock 8,942 5.55% $        273,399 68 1,422 
Overall Mean   $        313,995 60 1,623 
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Figure 2 displays the mean sale price of each property in our dataset by neighborhood.  There 
appears to be a tendency for prices to decrease the further the property is from the city center.  
It should be noted that even with a large dataset featuring a large number of records, some 
neighborhoods had few sales during the study period.  Forest Park has a high mean sale price, 
but this is driven by a relatively small number of high-value houses.  In contrast, the dark area in 
the center of the map includes the Irvington neighborhood which had a large number of sales 
and is still in the highest sale price category. 
 
Mean square footage of sale properties (Figure 3) is more dispersed than sale price.  Again, we 
can identify two neighborhoods (Irvington and Eastmoreland) in the inner-east side that tend to 
have larger houses, but there are also clusters of larger properties in the southwest and far-south 
east.  The combination of high sale prices and small properties in the central part of the city on 
both sides of the river again demonstrate the premium placed on living in the city center. 
 
Figure 4 displays the mean age of properties at time of sale by neighborhood.  There is a clear 
clustering of older properties in the inner-south east and inner-north east areas. The Downtown 
and Pearl neighborhoods have clusters of relatively new residences. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 taken together illustrate a primary driver of the findings of the analysis.  Figure 5 
displays the AV/RMV ratio as a percentage.  The inner-eastside in general has a larger split, 
reflecting the fact that properties values in this area have increased faster than in other areas 
with older residences.  The grouping of neighborhoods in blue includes the areas of North and 
Northeast Portland that have rapidly increased in value over the last decade.  When we check 
these areas on Figure 6, which shows actual tax paid, some of these same neighborhoods fall in 
the low-tax categories.  A large gap between AV and RMV does not mean that the owner of a 
property is paying low taxes because of differences in rates. Instead it means that these 
neighborhoods are paying less than what is expected based on location and sale price. 
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Figure 2: Mean Sale Price 2010-20133 
 
Figure 3: Mean Square Footage of Sales 2010-2013
 
                                                          
3 A map showing neighborhood groupings and names can be found in the Appendix (pg. 31) 
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Figure 4: Mean Age at Time of Sale 2010-2013 
 
Figure 5: Mean AV/RMV of Sales 2010-2013 
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Figure 6: Mean Tax Paid on Sale Properties 2010-2013 
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IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Tables II through V present regression results using variables and methodology discussed in 
previous sections. We estimated the effects of property tax capitalization using multiple 
specifications.  
Because the main purpose of this study is to 
estimate the effects of property tax 
differences on home values, we utilize three 
different measures of property taxes: 
AV/RMV ratio, combined AV/RMV ratio and 
compression ratio, and effective property 
tax rate (defined as taxes paid divided by 
RMV). All model specifications include the 
three measures, denoted as (a), (b) and (c), 
respectively. Across all three measures, we 
find that home values are generally higher 
when the property taxes are relatively lower 
compared to other properties with similar 
characteristics. However, the magnitude of 
influence varied significantly across model 
specifications. 
 
 
 
 
In Table II, we start with a simple specification (model I-I) to estimate property sale prices as a 
function of property size, age and AV/RMV ratio. The results show that every square-foot 
increases sale price by $176.39, each additional year of age decreases sale price by $74.89 and 
each additional percentage point increase in AV/RMV ratio (bringing assessed value closer to the 
real market value) decreases sale price by $1259.11. The R-squared value is known statistically 
as a coefficient of determination. It denotes the proportion of variation in property sale prices 
explained by the regression models. Model I-I(a) has an R-square equal to 50%, which indicates 
that the model captures 50% of the variation in sale prices without controlling for other factors 
that may also contribute. The regression results show that every additional square-foot 
consistently adds approximately $157 to $176 to home values, but property age did not always 
show a consistent sign. When measures of public school quality were incorporated, the 
estimations showed statistically significant positive impacts of both elementary level reading and 
math scores (percentage of students in a given public elementary school who meet or exceed 
standards on state exams) on home values. In addition, homes generally garnered higher sale 
Property Tax Measures - Notation 
AV/RMV ratio = 
 
Compression ratio = 
 
Effective Tax Rate =  
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prices when they were located closer to the central business district, had higher accessibility to 
amenities (as measured by the Walk Score®) and when crime rate per 1000 residents were lower.  
R-squared values ranged from 49% to 70% depending on model specifications, indicating that 
between 49% and 70% of the variation in housing prices is explained by our explanatory variables. 
We report robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors) to account for 
heteroscedasticity, or differences in variance across sub-populations of our dataset. In order to 
deal with endogeneity, we employed two separate sets of strategies: mixed-effects models and 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. We incorporated time fixed-effects using the year that the 
sale occurred to account for overall economic conditions and other omitted variables that vary 
across time. We also estimated additional neighborhood fixed-effects in order to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity that only varies across neighborhoods. Due to a lack of proper 
instrumental variables in our dataset, we only used whether a property was built before Measure 
50 (1997) as an instrument for the AV/RMV ratio, but did not find convincing estimation results 
(specification tests showed that this particular instrument did not effectively deal with 
endogeneity). 
Capitalization 
Using the definition of property capitalization presented by Ross and Yinger (1999), at discount 
rates of 3%, 5% and 7%, we expect a property that would last into perpetuity to show 
capitalization of $33.33, $20.00 and $14.29, respectively, for every dollar decrease in property 
taxes. If we assumed a 40 year lifespan for the properties, the capitalization of property tax 
decreases would become $23.11, $17.16 and $13.33, respectively.     
                                    
To illustrate capitalization of property tax differences in property value, we use the average 
house sold in our sample as an example. The average house is approximately 1600 square-feet, 
sold for $313,995 and has an AV/RMV ratio of 65.27% and an effective tax rate of 1.369%. Using 
the AV/RMV ratio as our variable of interest, our regressions show changes of -$310.39 to -
$1541.70 in property sale price for every percentage point increase in the AV/RMV ratio. 
Therefore, every dollar decrease of property tax results in a property value increase from $5.06 
to $25.11. Using the effective tax rate on RMV as our variable of interest, we estimate a change 
of between -$1766.49 to -$8969.64 in property value per 0.1% increase in the effective tax rate 
(or increase of one mill). In this case, every dollar decrease of property tax translates to between 
$6.05 and $30.72 of increase in the property value. 
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Figure 7: Summary of Effects 
 
Assuming a discount rate of 3% and perpetual lifespan of properties, we find that the 
capitalization of property taxes into property value in the Portland area ranges from 15% to 92%. 
Assuming a higher discount rate of 7% and a perpetual lifespan, capitalization of property taxes 
into property values is estimated to be between 35% and 215%. If property lifespans are assumed 
to be shorter, the capitalization effect will increase accordingly. We can conclude that property 
tax differentials within the jurisdiction do indeed impact home values (i.e., artificially lower 
property tax results in higher property value, holding everything else constant). It is clear that 
property values are a function of its own property characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, 
overall economic conditions and quantity and quality of public services.  
 
However, because many of these characteristics may be unobservable, non-quantifiable or 
imprecisely measured by the available data, it is difficult to definitively define the exact 
magnitude of capitalization through this exercise.  The necessary assumptions to accurately 
characterize property tax capitalization (e.g., choices of an appropriate social discount rate and 
property lifespan) further circumvent our ability to pinpoint the magnitude of capitalization 
without further research.  Further research directions and improvements are outlined in the 
following section. 
Average Portland House 
Sale Price = $ 313,995 | 1,600 Sqft  
Tax Rate (on AV) = 2.1% | RMV = $291,490 
AV/RMV Ratio = 65% | Effective Tax Rate (on RMV) = 1.37% 
 
AV/RMV Ratio 
45% 55% 65% 70% 75% 
Assessed Tax $2,755 $3,366 $3,979 $4,284 $4,591 
Actual Tax $2,755 $3,366 $3,979 $4,284 $4,372 
Sale Price 
$320,203 - 
$344,829 
$317,099 - 
$329,412 
$313,995 
$312,443 - 
$306,287 
$310,891 - 
$298,578 
Sale Price Change 
(Lower Bound) 
$6,208 $3,104  -$1,552 -$3,104 
Sale Price Change  
(Upper Bound) 
$30,834 $15,417  -$7,709 -$15,417 
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Table II - Property sale price regression results. Dependent variable: Sale price. (n=21216) 
 I-I(a) I-I(b) I-I(c) I-II(a) I-II(b) I-II(c) I-III(a) I-III(b) I-III(c) 
Property 
Characteristics 
      
   
Size of property (sqft) 
176.39** 
(3.09) 
176.45** 
(3.09) 
175.71** 
(3.09) 
176.48** 
(3.08) 
176.52** 
(3.08) 
176.05** 
(3.08) 
157.81** 
(3.47) 
157.87** 
(3.48) 
157.63** 
(3.48) 
Age of property 
-74.89* 
(42.01) 
-89.32** 
(41.88) 
96.00** 
(40.15) 
-134.75** 
(42.51) 
-140.43** 
(42.40) 
0.49 
(40.87) 
-87.58** 
(33.83) 
-91.65** 
(34.14) 
-59.73* 
(34.04) 
          
Tax Characteristics          
AV/RMV ratio 
-1259.11** 
(64.82) 
-1978.03** 
(93.34) 
 
-1412.32** 
(67.83) 
-1945.92** 
(94.55) 
 
-1100.00** 
(91.62) 
-1201.59** 
(124.56) 
 
Compression ratio  
-1801.74** 
(219.45) 
  
-1375.51** 
(218.23) 
 
 -209.15 
(206.78) 
 
Effective tax rate 
(mills) 
  
-4611.55** 
(360.76) 
  
-6477.28** 
(389.15) 
  -5721.55** 
(527.51) 
          
Fixed Effects – Year Sold  
(base = 2010) 
     
   
2011    
-4423.25 
(2813.14) 
-4649.38 
(2829.23) 
-8118.88** 
(2842.85) 
-11834.9** 
(2325.98) 
-11692.66** 
(2334.81) 
-13524.15** 
(2342.72) 
2012    
12236.5** 
(2815.08) 
10502.38** 
(2793.20) 
5515.53** 
(2862.67) 
5087.60** 
(2453.29) 
5056.15** 
(2451.04) 
2121.39 
(2478.81) 
2013    
39440.57** 
(2788.57) 
37081.58** 
(2785.38) 
40481.86** 
(2913.91) 
35153.34** 
(2373.44) 
34978.5** 
(2366.43) 
37719.94** 
(2586.84) 
          
Fixed Effects – Neighborhood          
Neighborhoods        Omitted Omitted Omitted 
          
Constant 
114298.8** 
(8195.65) 
332633** 
(25697.35) 
86175.41** 
(5405.53) 
114011.1** 
(8148.17) 
280592.3** 
(25494.16) 
105185.3** 
(8378.461) 
236781.6** 
(12184.05) 
263552.4** 
(26580.62) 
246478.6** 
(12329.54) 
          
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.69 
 
* Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence. 
** Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
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Table III - Property sale price regression results with school characteristics. Dependent variable: Sale price. (n=21216) 
 II-I(a) II-I(b) II-I(c) II-II(a) II-II(b) II-II(c) II-III(a) II-III(b) II-III(c) 
Property Characteristics          
Size of property (sqft) 
159.46** 
(3.13) 
159.54** 
(3.12) 
158.89** 
(3.13) 
159.45** 
(3.12) 
159.52** 
(3.12 
159.08** 
(3.12) 
157.40** 
(3.48) 
157.46** 
(3.49) 
157.22** 
(3.49) 
Age of property 
-75.67** 
(32.27) 
-89.94** 
(37.11) 
43.10 
(36.07) 
-140.66** 
(37.46) 
-146.13** 
(37.35) 
-74.39** 
(36.48) 
-93.89** 
(33.82) 
-97.72** 
(34.13) 
-66.00* 
(34.03) 
          
Tax Characteristics          
AV/RMV ratio 
-1373.89** 
(57.07) 
-2085.68** 
(85.39) 
 
-1541.70** 
(59.32) 
-2053.67** 
(86.13) 
 
-1092.98** 
(91.74) 
-1188.34** 
(124.81) 
 
Compression ratio  
-1779.84** 
(202.27) 
  
-1316.63** 
(200.63) 
  
-196.09 
(207.02) 
 
Effective tax rate (mills)   
-6630.94** 
(330.31) 
  
-8969.64** 
(356.30) 
  
-5673.93** 
(528.01) 
          
School Characteristics          
Reading score 
3369.22** 
(144.39) 
3417.88** 
(146.80) 
3404.23** 
(146.53) 
3294.20** 
(142.75) 
3402.59** 
(145.01) 
3523.72** 
(145.00) 
643.85** 
(212.54) 
653.45** 
(212.67) 
669.47** 
(212.88) 
Math score 
553.05** 
(130.28) 
414.90** 
(132.52) 
469.03** 
(132.23) 
551.94** 
(128.63) 
450.15** 
(130.81) 
406.61** 
(130.49) 
124.42 
(177.58) 
114.70 
(177.99) 
103.08 
(178.17) 
          
Fixed Effects – Year sold (base = 2010)         
2011    
-4242.38* 
(2558.31) 
-4452.78* 
(2556.11) 
-5196.43** 
(2571.42) 
-11789.81** 
(2324.45) 
-11656.71** 
(2333.32) 
-13487.34** 
(2341.30) 
2012    
13433.97** 
(2547.25) 
11781.79** 
(2527.26) 
11177.65** 
(2598.50) 
4945.78** 
(2451.183) 
4916.47** 
(2448.86) 
1973.71 
(2478.06) 
2013    
42495.08** 
(2527.32) 
40240.67** 
(2524.12) 
48393.3** 
(2643.05) 
35217.38** 
(2371.70) 
35044.47** 
(2363.39) 
37729.93** 
(2585.56) 
          
Fixed Effects – Neighborhood          
Neighborhoods        Omitted Omitted Omitted 
          
Constant 
-134512.6** 
(8212.86) 
79430.42** 
(23553.78) 
-144013** 
(8339.02) 
-136431.1** 
(8131.03) 
21815.01 
(23338.97) 
-125847.6** 
(8234.96) 
169374.2** 
(14105.38) 
194468.7** 
(27842.26) 
178447.3** 
(14365.38) 
          
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.70 0.69 0.70 
* Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence.  
 ** Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
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Table IV - Property sale price regression results with school and neighborhood characteristics. .  
Dependent variable: Sale price. (n=21216) 
 III-I(a) III-I(b) III-I(c) III-II(a) III-II(b) III-II(c) 
Property Characteristics       
Size of property (sqft) 
164.06** 
(3.07) 
164.03** 
(3.07) 
165.96** 
(3.14) 
165.96** 
(3.14) 
165.88** 
(3.18) 
165.84** 
(3.19) 
Age of property 
-76.02** 
(34.72) 
-62.82* 
(33.92) 
-93.53** 
(36.06) 
-81.64** 
(35.30) 
-95.04** 
(35.95) 
-84.68** 
(35.18) 
       
Tax Characteristics       
AV/RMV ratio 
-345.12** 
(67.54) 
 
-319.33** 
(67.33) 
 
-310.39** 
(67.52) 
 
Effective tax rate (mills)  
-1985.21** 
(383.84) 
 
-1835.66** 
(383.33) 
 
-1766.49** 
(381.84) 
       
School Characteristics       
Reading score 
1005.51** 
(146.40) 
1036.38** 
(147.49) 
1150.78** 
(146.80) 
1181.60** 
(147.89) 
1144.85** 
(147.10) 
1172.08** 
(148.06) 
Math score 
462.22** 
(126.59) 
428.56** 
(126.69) 
410.33** 
(126.31) 
378.41** 
(126.40) 
414.06** 
(126.90) 
385.11** 
(127.12) 
       
Neighborhood Characteristics      
Distance to CBD 
-28773.46** 
(702.10) 
-29035.75** 
(661.03) 
-26714.68** 
(855.78) 
-26925.35** 
(824.63) 
-26749.76** 
(850.29) 
-26965.56** 
(818.84) 
Walk Score ®   
299.23** 
(81.35) 
303.77** 
(81.42) 
313.90** 
(82.33) 
325.42** 
(82.56) 
Crime rate per 1000     
-7480.78 
(13323.83) 
-11180.14 
(13295.42) 
       
Fixed Effects – Year sold (base = 2010)      
2011 
-16138.94** 
(2479.90) 
-16387.63** 
(2479.57) 
-16422.04** 
(2483.07) 
-16654.52** 
(2482.35) 
-11491.54** 
(2473.94) 
-16736.22** 
(2474.68) 
2012 
-696.30 
(2457.47) 
-1230.60 
(2490.98) 
-1071.76 
(2460.97) 
-1569.195 
(2494.28) 
-1173.51 
(2454.79) 
-1685.06 
(2470.63) 
2013 
31382.46** 
(2423.29) 
32661.75** 
(2530.01) 
31089.68** 
(2423.79) 
32270.01** 
(2531.66) 
31011.08** 
(2420.52) 
32121.99** 
(2527.02) 
       
Constant 
81457.21** 
(7405.97) 
86266.8** 
(7722.52) 
42712.21** 
(11505.74) 
46577.58** 
(11737.05) 
42440.79** 
(11475.12) 
46078.11** 
(11697.75) 
       
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
* Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence.  
** Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
Table V - Instrumental variable  
regression results with school  
and neighborhood characteristics.  
Dependent variable: Sale price.  
(n=21216) 
 IV 
Property Characteristics  
Size of property (sqft) 
166.25** 
(3.26) 
Age of property 
-1622.76** 
(128.86) 
  
Tax Characteristics  
AV/RMV ratio 
-6374.25** 
(447.71) 
  
School Characteristics  
Reading score 
3500.60** 
(272.09) 
Math score 
39.89 
(176.97) 
  
Neighborhood Characteristics 
Distance to CBD 
-5949.47** 
(1729.37) 
  
Fixed Effects – Year sold (base = 2010) 
2011 
44687.62** 
(5481.80) 
2012 
78550.89** 
(6598.84) 
2013 
94671.16** 
(5522.21) 
  
Constant 
257221.7** 
(16156.86) 
  
R-squared 0.48 
* Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence. 
** Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
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V. FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In order to deal with potential selection bias and endogeneity that may exist within our sample 
of home sales, we may be able to construct a time series dataset that includes multiple sales of 
the same properties. In this alternative specification, we can then employ the change in sale 
prices as the dependent variable, and changes in property characteristics, property tax 
characteristics, neighborhood/location characteristics and public service characteristics as 
explanatory variables. Additional socioeconomic and demographic data from the Census or 
American Community Survey (ACS) may also be incorporated into the analysis to provide 
additional instruments for statistical issues, and to provide better controls for neighborhood 
heterogeneity.  
 
Before Measure 50 was implemented, home values were re-evaluated on a 7 year rolling 
schedule. When Measure 50 was implemented, assessed values were set at 90% of 1995-1996 
tax rolls. Home values may or may not have been subject to a recent re-evaluation, adding an 
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additional layer of arbitrary treatment of properties in the property tax system. If we are able to 
obtain data on when the most recent re-assessment occurred before Measure 50, it may enable 
us to better explain more of the property tax variations. 
 
One method of estimating how differences in property tax treatment can capitalize into property 
values is to utilize the difference-in-difference (DID) approach. This approach was popularized by 
Card and Krueger (1994) in their article studying the effects of increasing minimum wages in New 
Jersey by including Pennsylvania (which did not have an increase in minimum wage) as a control. 
Because of Portland metropolitan area’s unique geographic location with portions located in 
both Oregon and Washington, we may be able to adopt the DID approach with property data 
from neighboring Oregon and Washington counties to isolate the impacts of differential property 
tax regimes. Additionally, this approach may also be applied across different Oregon jurisdictions 
that experienced booms in property development during varying time periods (before and after 
Measure 5 and 50 were implemented). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on our estimation results, we believe that Oregon’s property tax structure is significantly 
affecting home sale prices in Portland.  Statistical issues prevent us from confidently stating the 
exact size of the effect, but the consistent sign and high significance of the estimated coefficients 
lead us to that conclusion.  The structure of the tax is creating a distortion in the market for 
houses and condos, which benefits certain property owners (and harms others) for reasons that 
are arbitrary from a policy perspective.   
Changes in the ratio between assessed value (AV) and real market value (RMV) are driven mostly 
by changes in RMV; in areas where RMV has risen quickly, this gap grows.  Our study indicates 
that this gap adds additional value to homes, exacerbating existing inequities.  Property owners 
living in areas where RMV rises quickly relative to AV are enjoying an increase in their property 
value that is not derived from property or neighborhood improvements.  Instead this increase is 
a by-product of a property tax system separated from the market.   
Expanding this analysis was beyond the scope of the project, but it is reasonable to expect these 
dynamics to be present in other parts of Oregon.  In cities where properties in different 
neighborhoods or areas have appreciated faster than in others since the passage of Measures 5 
and 50, we would expect to see similar results.  The size of the distortion would vary based on 
local characteristics, but we would expect to see evidence of capitalization.     
Because these inequities are concentrated in areas where residential values have increased 
rapidly relative to AV, the property tax system creates a hidden subsidy for these property 
owners.  Some of the burden of funding government and school services is transferred away from 
these homeowners.  This results in revenue shortfalls, or creates the need for property owners 
in areas with a smaller increase in RMV to disproportionately fill the gap.  The unequal 
distribution of funding responsibility created by the property tax system may clash with existing 
government priorities in a way that is not understood by policymakers or voters. 
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APPENDIX: Portland Neighborhood Map 4 
 
                                                          
4 Map from City of Portland: Neighborhood Involvement.  Can be found at: 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/oni/28385 [Last Accessed 2/27/2014] 
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